New York Ordered Utilities to Inventory Their AI. What Happens When It Changes?

By KEIRSTEN BRAGER

New York now requires 12 named electric, gas, and water utilities to report all artificial intelligence (AI) use cases in their operations and disclose how those uses are governed. Arizona is examining related questions through an open docket. Both proceedings ask utilities to describe their AI use at a point in time, and AI systems do not always stay inside the boundaries documented or approved at that point.

What Regulators Are Asking For

New York: An Inventory Due in 60 Days

On September 17, 2026, the New York State Public Service Commission issued an Order Initiating Proceeding in Case 26-M-0552. It directs 12 named electric, gas, and water utilities, including Con Edison, National Grid, New York State Electric & Gas, and Central Hudson, to submit within 60 days (by November 16, 2026, unless the Commission's Secretary grants an extension) a report covering all AI use cases in their operations.

"The Commission directs the Subject Utilities to inventory and report all use cases of AI systems in their operations. These reports shall be detailed and descriptive regarding the AI system used, the functional objective of the system, and the level of human oversight." (New York State Public Service Commission, Case 26-M-0552)

The reports must describe each AI system, its functional objective, and the level of human oversight. A second filing, due the same day, must disclose the policies, procedures, and protocols that govern each utility's AI use, including "verification methodologies, pre-deployment testing, human oversight protocols, override capabilities, and data privacy practices."

The Commission will review the disclosed governance practices in light of each utility's statutory obligation to provide safe and reliable service. At the session where the order was adopted, Dennis Dibari of the Department of Public Service staff, who presented the order, called it "step zero" for inventorying AI use and said he would propose that the Commission require utilities to update the inventory as new use cases emerge during the proceeding. Chair Rory Christian said utilities will file semiannual reports. The order's own text sets only the two filings due within 60 days.

Arizona: Gathering Input First

On March 24, 2026, Arizona Corporation Commissioner Lea Márquez Peterson opened Docket No. AU-00000A-26-0060 to examine how regulated electric, natural gas, and water utilities use AI in planning, forecasting, storm response, procurement, plant operations, and distribution systems. The docket requests information from utilities, and Arizona Public Service filed a response in April. A Special Open Meeting workshop is scheduled for October 21, 2026, where Commissioners will hear from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), four utilities, and Commission staff.


What the Australian Incidents Show

On June 18, 2026, an OpenAI agent researching public medicine spending during an internal evaluation gained access to non-public files on a Medicare statistics portal administered by Services Australia. Australia's Prime Minister made the incident public on September 24, and OpenAI said its models took actions it did not intend. OpenAI later notified the New South Wales government of a second June incident involving a web application containing historical fire data.

OpenAI operated the models and the evaluation environment, and by its own account it did not become aware of the Medicare activity until August 11, about eight weeks later. A utility running an agent that a vendor controls or updates will usually have less visibility into that agent than its developer has. An inventory filed in November can describe such a system accurately on the day it is filed and miss what the system does the following month.

Figure 1
AI Oversight and AI Agent Incidents in 2026
Timeline of 2026 state AI oversight actions and OpenAI agent incidents in Australia A horizontal timeline of eight events in 2026. The events are evenly spaced, and the spacing does not reflect elapsed time. Regulatory actions are dark, AI agent incidents are red, and upcoming dates are hollow. March 24, Arizona Corporation Commissioner Lea Márquez Peterson opens an AI inquiry docket. June 18, an OpenAI agent accesses non-public files on a Medicare statistics portal administered by Services Australia. August 11, OpenAI becomes aware of the activity during an internal review. A bracket between June 18 and August 11 notes that about eight weeks passed before OpenAI found it. September 10, OpenAI emails Services Australia. September 17, the New York State Public Service Commission issues its order directing 12 utilities to inventory their AI use. October 1, OpenAI notifies the New South Wales government of a second June incident involving historical fire data. October 21, Arizona holds its AI workshop. November 16, New York inventory and governance filings are due, 60 days after the order. AI agent incident Regulatory action Upcoming date 2026 Mar 24 Arizona opens AI inquiry docket Jun 18 OpenAI agent accesses Medicare statistics portal Aug 11 OpenAI becomes aware in internal review Sep 10 OpenAI emails Services Australia Sep 17 New York Commission issues AI order Oct 1 OpenAI reports second incident to New South Wales Oct 21 Arizona AI workshop Nov 16 New York filings due (60 days) About eight weeks before OpenAI found it
All dates 2026. Events are evenly spaced and the spacing does not reflect elapsed time. The Medicare statistics portal is administered by Services Australia, and the fire data application is operated by the New South Wales National Parks and Wildlife Service. The November 16 date is computed as 60 days from the September 17 order and can be extended by the Commission's Secretary. Sources: New York State Public Service Commission, Order Initiating Proceeding, Case 26-M-0552 (September 17, 2026); Arizona Corporation Commission news releases of March 27 and September 29, 2026; ABC News (Australia), September 24 and October 2, 2026.

Keeping the Inventory Current

"The actual extent and scope of AI systems in New York utility operations remains unclear, however, as no current inventory of use cases in the industry exists today." (New York PSC, Case 26-M-0552)

An AI use-case inventory is accurate until something material changes, such as a model update, new privileges for a service account, a recommendation tool that gains the ability to submit or execute, a new application programming interface (API) connecting the system to operational data, or a human approval step that is removed.

Shared ownership makes these changes harder to detect. When information technology (IT) owns the platform, a business unit owns the use case, operational technology (OT) owns the affected environment, and a vendor controls the model, no single party may be accountable for deciding when the inventory and risk assessment need an update. Without a designated owner for inventory accuracy, material changes may not reach the people responsible for governance or regulatory reporting.

What CIP Programs Already Do

The New York and Arizona proceedings do not create NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) requirements. The comparisons below are control analogies, and whether a given AI system falls within CIP scope is a separate determination. They show disciplines NERC-registered entities can use when AI affects Bulk Electric System (BES) Cyber Systems, reliability processes, sensitive operational information, or existing security controls.

What state oversight examines Relevant CIP discipline Existing control practice
AI use cases and operational scope CIP-002 Identify, categorize, and document applicable scope
Governance policies and accountability CIP-003 Maintain approved security policies and delegated responsibility
Human and nonhuman privileges CIP-004 and CIP-007 Authorize personnel access, and manage accounts and permissions
Connections and access paths CIP-005 Control and monitor applicable electronic access
Verification and applicable testing CIP-010 Maintain baselines and assess applicable changes before deployment
Sensitive information handling CIP-011 Identify BES Cyber System Information (BCSI) and protect and securely handle it
Vendor and product changes CIP-013 Address supply-chain risks in procurement and vendor relationships

CIP-010 ties an approved baseline to a controlled change process, which is the discipline an AI inventory needs once it is filed. It does not apply to every AI system or every model update, and as an earlier post on AI changes outside the change process explains, a vendor-side model update can change how a tool behaves without changing any element of a CIP-010 baseline.

Many AI tools used for planning, forecasting, procurement, and customer operations can sit in corporate IT outside CIP scope. State oversight may reach systems that CIP does not, and those systems may not inherit the same configuration-management discipline.

Which Changes Should Trigger Review?

Reviewing every change would add a heavy administrative load, so material triggers should be defined by changes to a

Trigger Change that prompts review
Permissions New roles, scopes, or service accounts
Integrations New systems, APIs, or data feeds
Operational authority Advisory to autonomous action
Model behavior Retraining, new model, or new version
Human approvals Approval steps added or removed
Monitoring Logging or alerting changes
Override Kill switch or fallback changes
Data classification New BCSI or sensitive data in scope
Vendor updates Vendor-pushed model or feature changes
 

Questions to Ask Now, by Role

CIP Senior Manager or Delegate

  • Which AI use cases touch systems or processes inside existing CIP scope?

  • Could an AI capability change alter a baseline, access path, security control, or BCSI repository?

  • What evidence would show that an AI-initiated action was approved?

Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) and Regulatory Teams

  • Who owns ongoing inventory maintenance after the filing?

  • Which changes require the filing, internal inventory, or risk assessment to be revisited?

  • Can governance claims be supported by technical evidence?

Capital Allocators

  • What discovery, logging, identity, monitoring, and evidence-correlation capabilities are missing?

  • Which vendor contracts must be revised?

  • Are we funding a one-time inventory or a sustainable control process?

Utility AI Inventory and Change-Control Checklist

For each AI use case, the inventory should record the items in Table 3.

Area What the inventory records
Use and ownership Approved use and operating objective. Business and technical owners.
Model and vendor Model, provider, and deployed version. Vendor notice requirements for model or feature changes.
Connections and data Connected systems, APIs, tools, and data feeds. Sensitive-data and BCSI repositories.
Authority Authorized read, recommend, submit, approve, write, and execute actions. Human approval and escalation points.
Identity and access Accounts, roles, service identities, and privileges.
Change control Material changes that trigger review. Tested override, containment, and rollback.
Logging and evidence Logging sufficient to attribute consequential actions. Evidence of approval, testing, deployment, and monitoring.
Boundaries Applicable regulatory and NERC CIP boundaries.
 

A Readiness Test

One test of an inventory process is whether the organization could reproduce its AI inventory six months after the first filing and show who approved each material change in between. If New York's semiannual reports follow as the Chair described, the 12 named utilities will face that test at their second filing.


 

Sources and Further Reading

 

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